William McKenna v. City of Philadelphia by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-5-2014 
William McKenna v. City of Philadelphia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"William McKenna v. City of Philadelphia" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 1215. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/1215 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 1 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1767 
___________ 
 
WILLIAM K. MCKENNA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; SHELLEY R. SMITH, CITY SOLICITOR;  
MAYOR MICHAEL NUTTER; 3 JOHN DOE’S; 3 JANE DOE’S, INDIVIDUALLY 
AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-07092) 
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 1, 2014 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 5, 2014) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant William McKenna appeals the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Michael Nutter, and City Solicitor 
Shelley Smith on his claim that the defendants refused to reinstate him to his position as a 
police officer in retaliation for his maintaining a successful federal action against the 
City.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard of 
review.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 This case is the third employment-related action that McKenna has instituted 
against the City and its officials and employees.  First, in March 1999, McKenna filed a 
complaint in federal court alleging that employees of the Philadelphia Police Department 
took discriminatory and retaliatory actions against white police officers, like himself, 
who complained about the mistreatment of black officers.  While that action was 
pending, McKenna was fired for failing five sick checks;1 an arbitrator upheld that 
termination.  More than two years later, McKenna sought to amend his complaint to add 
a wrongful-termination claim, but the District Court denied his request, concluding that 
the claim was time-barred.  McKenna’s case proceeded to trial, and a jury found that the 
defendants had unlawfully retaliated against him in a number of ways; McKenna was 
ultimately awarded $300,000.  The parties filed cross appeals, with McKenna challenging 
the District Court’s refusal to permit him to amend his complaint to attack his 
                                              
1 As the District Court explained, “While on medical leave, McKenna was subject to 
‘sick checks,’ in which supervisors would visit his house and confirm he was there.”  
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 98-5835, 2010 WL 2891591, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. July 20, 2010). 
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termination.  This Court affirmed.  See McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 173 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2011).  (We will refer to this action as McKenna I.) 
 Soon after the District Court denied McKenna’s motion to amend, and while 
McKenna I remained pending in the District Court, McKenna filed a second complaint, 
again challenging his termination.  The District Court dismissed the complaint as 
duplicative of McKenna I.  McKenna appealed, and we affirmed, noting that the Court 
would not permit him to “revive [the wrongful-termination] claim in this case.”  
McKenna v. City of Phila., 304 F. App’x 89, 93 (3d Cir. 2008).  (We will refer to this 
action as McKenna II). 
 In June 2012, soon after the jury returned a verdict in McKenna I — but despite 
failing to mount a successful challenge to his termination — McKenna wrote a letter to 
Mayor Nutter asking to be reinstated as a police officer.  Mayor Nutter denied 
McKenna’s request and directed him to Solicitor Smith, who likewise declined to seek 
McKenna’s reinstatement.  McKenna then filed his third action, which is at issue in this 
appeal.  Relying on Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 
McKenna alleged that the defendants had refused to reinstate him in retaliation for his 
filing and prevailing in McKenna I.2   
 The parties took discovery, and the defendants then moved for summary 
judgment.  The defendants presented evidence, which McKenna did not meaningfully 
                                              
2 McKenna also alleged that the defendants had improperly provided false information to 
prospective employers.  He has not raised any claims of error concerning the District 
Court’s disposition of that claim, however, so we will not address it here.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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challenge, that Philadelphia Civil Service Regulation 15.03 prohibits the reinstatement of 
an employee who was involuntarily terminated, and that Mayor Nutter and Solicitor 
Smith lacked the authority to reinstate him in the face of that regulation.  Based on this 
evidence, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion.  McKenna then filed a 
timely notice of appeal to this Court.   
 We discern no error in the District Court’s disposition of this case.  As an initial 
matter, McKenna has not presented a viable retaliation claim under Title VII3 concerning 
the defendants’ refusal to reinstate him.  Courts have repeatedly recognized that “an 
employee may not extend or circumvent the limitations period by requesting modification 
or reversal of an employer’s prior action.”  Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121, 
131 (1st Cir. 2009).  This general rule applies with full force to failure-to-reinstate 
claims:  as we recognized in another context, “[a] discharged employee who seeks to be 
reinstated is really litigating the unfairness of his original discharge because only if the 
original discharge was discriminatory is he entitled to be reinstated as if he had never 
ceased working for the employer.”  NLRB. v. Textile Mach. Works, 214 F.2d 929, 932 
(3d Cir. 1954).  Thus, to successfully challenge the reinstatement decision, McKenna 
must show that the defendants’ refusal to reinstate him involved a “new” illegal act 
“separate from the original discharge.”  EEOC v. City of Norfolk Police Dep’t, 45 F.3d 
80, 84 (4th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted); see generally EEOC v. Hall’s Motor 
Transit Co., 789 F.2d 1011, 1015 (3d Cir. 1986). 
                                              
3 The parties agree that McKenna’s PHRA claim is governed by the same standards as his 
Title VII claim, so we will not address the PHRA claim separately.  See, e.g., Goosby v. 
Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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 McKenna has presented no evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to find a 
separate act of retaliation.  McKenna has not meaningfully challenged the defendants’ 
assertion that Regulation 15.03 bars his reinstatement, and he does not argue that the 
defendants have failed to apply the regulation to other individuals who were terminated.  
Cf. City of Norfolk Police Dep’t, 45 F.3d at 84.  Rather, he relies on the same allegations 
of retaliation — unhappiness about McKenna I — that he claimed caused his termination.  
McKenna cannot, in this way, “resurrect” his time-barred wrongful-termination claim.  
Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 
 Moreover, even assuming that McKenna has stated an actionable claim concerning 
the defendants’ refusal to reinstate him, we agree with the District Court that the 
defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor.  We will assume, like the District 
Court, that McKenna has established a prima facie case of retaliation.  The burden thus 
shifts to the defendants to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for their 
refusal to reinstate McKenna.  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).  As 
the District Court concluded, the defendants carried this burden:  they presented 
undisputed evidence that Civil Service Regulation 15.03 prohibits the reinstatement of 
individuals, like McKenna, who were involuntarily terminated.  Thus, the burden shifts 
back to McKenna “to establish that the employer’s proffered justification for the adverse 
action is pretextual.”  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 On appeal, McKenna seeks to make this showing in two ways.  First, he argues 
that Regulation 15.03, “a lowly municipal regulation[,] cannot trump a federal or state 
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anti-retaliation statute.”  Appellant’s Br. at 22.  Contrary to McKenna’s claim, however, 
the regulation does not somehow contradict the antidiscrimination statutes; it merely 
provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the defendants’ refusal to 
reinstate him (after he failed to successfully challenge his termination).  See, e.g., Sarullo 
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2003) (accepting U.S. Postal Service 
“policy against rehiring an employee who is terminated with cause” as a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for action).   
 Second, McKenna argues that because a jury found that he suffered retaliation in 
the past, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the defendants had, in fact, 
retaliated against him here.  However, McKenna has presented no evidence to suggest 
that the same individuals who previously retaliated against him were involved in the 
decision not to reinstate him.  See Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 379 
(6th Cir. 2002).  Moreover, the defendants presented evidence, which McKenna has not 
rebutted, that Regulation 15.03 prohibited them from rehiring him, and McKenna has 
thus failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that McKenna 
I was a but-for cause of the defendants’ refusal to reinstate him.  See Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532 (2013) (noting that it would be inconsistent 
with “both the text and purpose of Title VII” to allow a plaintiff to recover on a 
retaliation claim based on one employer’s alleged retaliatory motive when an affiliation 
agreement required the employer to act in the way that it did); see generally Delaney v. 
Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 168 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014).   
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 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment for the reasons herein 
above stated as well as the reasons so well set forth in the comprehensive opinion dated 
February 28, 2014 rendered by District Court Judge Davis. 
